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DESIGN AND EVALUATION OF A SENSOR FAIL-OPERATIONAL CONTROL
SYSTEM FOR A DIGITALLY CONTROLLED TURBOFAN ENGINE
by Frank J. Hrach, DaleJ. Arpasi, and William M. Bruton
Lewis Research Center
SUMMARY
A sensor fail-operational digital control system for the TF30-P-3 afterburning
turbofan engine was designed and evaluated. The system has the capability of storing
(learning) engine operational data when the engine measurements are valid. Four en-
gine measurements, corrected to compressor face conditions, are tested for catastroph-
ic sensor failure. Any valid measurements are replaced with estimates obtained from
the valid measurements and tables of operational data previously stored in the computer
memory. Data are stored for the engine bleed settings and for both steady-state and
acceleration dynamic conditions. The compressor face measurements are tested for
any unrealistic variations because the procedure is based upon these signals being cor-
rect.
The sensor fail-operational system consists of (1) a digitalization of the standard
bill-of-materials (BOM) control for the TF30-P-3 engine and (2) a separate sensor fail-
operational digital computer program written especially for the BOM control. It is not
a completely new control system designed specifically to incorporate fail-operational
requirements.
The system was evaluated on a real-time, nonlinear, hybrid-computer simulation
of the TF30-P-3 turbofan engine. Flight conditions examined were sea-level static con-
dition, a typical cruise condition, and several extreme flight conditions.
The study indicates that acceptable control over the range of flight conditions ex-
amined is possible with certain levels of sensor failure. For nonafterburning operation,
acceptable control is possible even after three of the four engine sensors have failed.
For afterburning operation, adequate control can be achieved with no more than a single
failure and then only if a modest rate limit is imposed upon engine acceleration. Ac-
ceptable control means that none of the engine operating limits have been exceeded and
that nearly the same engine thrust performance is achieved.
This work indicates that it is possible to design a sensor fail-operational control
system for an aircraft engine which will improve the engine's reliability.
INTRODUCTION
The state of the art of digital computers qualified for aircraft use has advanced to
the point where they are now being applied to engine control. A supervisory digital
control system is already in use on the advanced military F100-PW-100 engine. For
aircraft engine control, as in other control applications, digital control offers some at-
tractive potential benefits. They include lower initial cost; lower maintenance costs;
and the ability to implement more accurate control, resulting in improved engine per-
formance. Also digital control offers the capability of easily changing a control mode
by simply reprogramming the computer or of modifying the existing control mode during
operation by a higher-level adaptive control loop. New engine designs are becoming
more complex and require more complex control; and the interaction between airframe,
inlet, and propulsion system is becoming more critical for newer aircraft designs.
Future control systems must have the capability of providing these complex control
functions and of integrating the control of interacting components. A digital control
system has this capability.
For digital control to be viable, steps must be taken to ensure that the reliability of
full-authority, flight-qualified, digital propulsion control systems approaches that of the
well-proved hydromechanical systems presently used on aircraft engines. This applies
to the entire system, which includes sensors, effectors, and the digital computer. Re-
liability can be improved, of course, by means of redundancy for all the elements of the
control system. In the digital computer, self-testing and redundancy can be incorpo-
rated relatively easily. However, using redundant sensors and effectors may not be
practical. An alternative approach for handling failures of these elements is fail-
operational control. Essentially, this approach involves using a model of the system to
provide information necessary for control in the event of a failure. (Of course, this ap-
proach can also be used in conjunction with redundancy.)
This report is concerned with sensor failures only and describes the design of a
control system which would continue to function adequately even though some engine
measurements normally needed for control were not available. A control system of
this type is herein referred to as a sensor fail-operational control system. The goal of
this and any fail-operational control system is to achieve system performance within ac-
ceptable limits for as many failures as possible.
Some theoretical work has been done in the field of fail-operational control. A
rather extensive treatment is contained in reference 1. That research develops methods
of self-reorganization which can provide a complex linear dynamic system with the abil-
ity to restructure itself to compensate for failures in the effectors and sensors and for
changes in the linear dynamics. The approach taken is to identify the failure or change
in the system and use that information to restructure a feedback control loop to maintain
closed-loop stability if possible.
A different approach is taken in reference 2, which is concerned only with sensor
failures in an aircraft flight control system. The innovations from a bank of Kalman
filters are used to detect sensor failures by means of M-ary hypothesis testing. The
detection logic then selects the optimal state estimate from the bank of Kalman filters.
Capabilities of the method are demonstrated by a real-time linear simulation of the sys-
tem with noisy sensors.
The design of a sensor fail-operational control system for a two-spool turbofan en-
gine is presented in reference 3. Ten estimates of each critical engine variable are
made by using sensor measurements and a multivariable linearized engine model. The
differences between estimates provides the basis for identifying any sensors that have
failed. A weighted average of valid estimates is used for control. Corrected engine
measurements were used, which permitted the same model to be used for all flight con-
ditions. This system was checked out on a nonlinear digital simulation of the engine.
In reference 4 a sensor fail-operational control system was designed and tested on
an actual turbojet engine in a sea-level test stand. The relation between two sensor
measurements was stored in a digital computer during normal engine operation. When
either sensor failed, an estimate obtained from the valid sensor measurement and the
stored relation was used to successfully control the engine. The engine tested was a
single-spool J85 turbojet. A limitation of that work was that only a single operating
condition (sea-level static) could be examined.
The present work is an extension of that reported in reference 4. In the present
study, a wide range of flight conditions is investigated, rather than a single flight con-
dition. Corrected engine variables are used to handle the wide variations in the engine
measurements. The present work is done for a more advanced engine, a two-spool
turbofan engine, the TF30-P-3. Also, four engine variables are tested, not two as was
done in reference 4. Instead of testing the sensor fail-operational system on an actual
engine, a real-time nonlinear hybrid computer simulation was used. It is felt that the
engine simulation models the engine with sufficient accuracy to permit evaluation of the
control system. With an engine simulation, a wide range of flight conditions can be ex-
amined relatively easily without the need for an elaborate test facility.
As was done in reference 4, relations between the engine measurements are stored
in the digital computer during normal operation. Now, however, the measurements are
in corrected variable form. Estimates for any erroneous measurements are made in a
manner similar to that of reference 4. With this approach, the sensor fail-operational
system can be thought of as storing an algebraic model of the engine under normal con-
trol. It assumes that unique relations exist between the measured engine variables.
This is true for a particular engine geometry and operating condition. If the rela-
tions between the measurements change significantly with configuration (such as bleed
settings) and dynamic condition (steady state or transient), it is necessary to store data
for each case. This task is well suited for a digital computer because of its large mem-
ory capacity. Here actual nonlinear functions relating the corrected engine measure-
ments are stored, whereas in reference 3 only linear approximations of the relations are
made.
The report first describes the system used in the evaluation of the sensor fail-
operational system that was developed. It then discusses the concept in general terms.
Following this, the application of the concept to the TF30-P-3 engine is described.
Finally, the results obtained with the sensor fail-operational system are presented.
TF30-P-3 ENGINE AND CONTROL
Engine
A schematic representation of the TF30-P-3 engine with station designations is pre-
sented in figure 1. The TF30-P-3 engine is a two-spool, mixed-flow, afterburning turbo-
fan engine. A three-stage, axial-flow fan is mounted on the same shaft with a six-stage,
axial-flow, low-pressure compressor driven by a three-stage, low-pressure turbine. A
seven-stage, axial-flow, high-pressure compressor is driven by a single-stage, air-
cooled, high-pressure turbine. The engine has a hydraulically actuated, variable-area
exhaust nozzle which changes area only during afterburning. The afterburner fuel spray-
rings are arranged in five separate afterburning zones. There are two compressor
bleeds: a seventh-stage bleed on the low-pressure compressor and a twelfth-stage bleed
on the high-pressure compressor.
The variables used for control of the TF30- P-3 are listed in table I under the cat-
egories of command input, flight condition, measured compressor face, measured en-
gine, manipulated, and controlled variables. Reference 5 includes a rather detailed
description of the operation of the control system. In the present report, it is sufficient
to point out that the main fuel flow is determined by two measured engine variables: the
high-pressure-rotor speed and the high-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure
(which is approximately equal to the combustor pressure). The afterburner fuel flow and
the exhaust nozzle area are determined by three measured engine variables: high-
pressure-rotor speed, high-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure, and nozzle
total pressure. The seventh-stage-bleed position is determined by the inlet Mach num-
ber; the twelfth-stage-bleed position is a function of the low-pressure-compressor dis-
charge static pressure and the compressor face total pressure.
The operating limits for the engine which determine the range of the compressor
face variables are presented in figure 2. These limits are based upon standard-day con-
ditions and a MIL-E-5008B inlet pressure recovery. The extreme values of compressor
face total temperature and pressure are noted on the figure. Note the more than 2:1
variation in total temperature and the 30:1 variation in total pressure. (Symbols are de-
fined in the appendix.)
Engine and Inlet Simulation
The TF30-P-3 engine with a standard inlet has been simulated by using the Lewis
Research Center's analog and hybrid computing facility. The simulation, which oper-
ates in real time, is described in reference 6. It consists of a fully dynamic represen-
tation of the engine but only a steady-state representation of an inlet with a standard
MIL-E-5008 B pressure recovery.
The simulation is done on the Electronic Associates, Inc. (EAI) Model 690 Hybrid
Computing System, which consists of an EAI 640 Digital Computer, an EAI 693 Hybrid
Interface Unit, and an EAI 680 Analog Computer. Two EAI 231-R Analog Computers
are also used. Figure 3 illustrates the split of the computational load among the various
computers. The split is based on the computing equipment complement of each console
and a desire to minimize trunking. The bulk of the calculations are performed on the
EAI 680 and the two 231-R Analog Computers. The analog computers perform all the
operations characteristic of analog machines (i. e., summing, integration with respect to
time, multiplication, attenuation, univariate function generation, etc.). The use of pe-
ripheral equipment such as x-y plotters and strip-chart recorders allows continuous user
monitoring of computed variables. All the required analog computers are tied togeth-
er by means of a Centralized Trunk System to allow the transmittal of information be-
tween analog consoles.
The 640 Digital Computer is used primarily to perform the bivariate function gen-
eration associated with fan, compressor, and turbine performance. The digital comput-
er also provides teletypewriter output listings of selected engine variables. In order to
minimize the core storage requirements and digital cycle time, scaled-fraction variables
and arithmetic routines are used in the digital program. Scaled-fraction variables are
limited to values between ±1. The use of scaled fractions necessitates the scaling of
digital variables in the same manner as the analog variables are scaled.
The digital portion of the simulation requires approximately 10 000 words of core
storage. The resulting digital sampling interval (with steady analog inputs) is about
4. 65 milliseconds, which allows real-time simulation of engine dynamics. The analog
portion of the TF30-P-3 hybrid simulation performs all the required computations ex-
cept the bivariate function generation previously discussed. The analog computational
load is split between the 680 Analog Computer and two 231-R Analog Computers. Ap-
proximately 185 amplifiers and 85 multipliers are required to perform the analog cal-
culations. The 680 Analog Computer also serves as the interface between the engine
simulation and the digital engine controller. The manipulated variables for the engine
simulation are provided by an independent digital computer representation of the TF30-
P-3 hydromechanical control system described in the next section.
Digital Engine Control
A digitization of the TF30-P-3 bill-of-materials (BOM) control has been devel-
oped for use on the Lewis Research Center's digital computer control facility for on-line
control of airbreathing propulsion systems. This digital computer program has been
used successfully to control the engine and inlet simulation just described. A detailed
description of the program and the results obtained with it are given in reference 5. The
digital computer program requires only about 5000 words of the 16 000-word memory
available in the facility. Calculation time is as short as 3.2 milliseconds. The matter
of necessary sampling time for acceptable control is also investigated in reference 5
and in an earlier report, reference 7. Both these studies indicate that a sampling inter-
val time as long as 50 milliseconds is acceptable. A value of 25 milliseconds was sel-
ected for this study. Accurately modeling the hydromechanical control requires that the
effect of dynamics for fuel lines and control actuators be taken into account. Two small
analog computers are used to model the dynamic relations of these components.
The unused digital control computer memory and the available calculation time are
used for the sensor fail-operational computer program. This is described in the section
IMPLEMENTATION ON THE TF30-P-3 ENGINE.
The Lewis Research Center's digital computer control facility, which is described
in reference 8, was also used in the earlier sensor fail-operational work conducted at
Lewis (ref. 4). The heart of the system is a Systems Engineering Laboratories (SEL)
Model 810B process control computer with a basic 16 000-word memory.
Table II (extracted from ref. 8) lists some of the digital system capabilities. The
computer and its associated equipment are not flight-qualified hardware. However,
characteristics such as cycle time, memory, and interrupt structure are typical of what
may exist in some future flight system.
A diagram of the complete system used in the sensor fail-operational study is pre-
sented in figure 4. The variables transferred to the system and between the components
are indicated on the diagram.
SENSOR FAIL-OPERATIONAL CONTROL
Conceptual Basis
Sensor fail-operational control is based on the fact that for a given engine geometry
and dynamic condition the same relations exist between certain corrected engine vari-
ables over a wide range of power settings and flight conditions. An example of these
relations is an operating line on a cor reeled-variable compressor map, shown sche-
matically in figure 5. As indicated in the figure, throttle setting determines a point on
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the operating line. At that point, a unique relation exists between the variables on the
map: pressure ratio, corrected engine speed, and corrected airflow. If one variable,
for example, pressure ratio, is unavailable, it can be estimated from either of the other
two variables at the operating point - from corrected speed, for example. This estima-
tion can be carried out on a digital computer by first storing the relation between these
two variables along the operating line.
In the compressor map example, a change in engine geometry, such as a bleed
opening, causes a shift of the operating line. It is necessary therefore to store ad-
ditional relations between the variables for those engine configurations for which the
change in the operating line is significant. Also, the locus of operating points during
acceleration of the engine shifts toward the surge line. Data for both steady state and
acceleration may have to be stored if the shift is large.
The measured engine variables are corrected by the compressor face conditions of
total temperature and pressure. They are corrected as indicated in reference 9, rather
than being made dimensionless.
Incorporation in an Engine Control System
The sensor fail-operational concept might be made part of an engine control sys-
tem, as illustrated in figure 6. In this figure, a conventional control system is com-
pared with a system having sensor fail-operational capability, herein called a sensor
fail-operational control system. In the conventional control system, the command in-
put, flight condition, measured compressor face, and measured engine variables go
directly to the engine control. In a possible sensor fail-operational control system, all
these variables except the flight condition variables go to a separate digital program
which performs the following functions:
(1) Stores the corrected engine measurements during normal operation for all
significant engine configurations and dynamic conditions
(2) After sufficient data are stored, continuously checks the engine measurements
to determine whether any are invalid because of a failed sensor
(3) In case of a failure, provides an estimate for the invalid measurement based on
the valid measurements and the data stored in the computer for the particular
engine geometry and dynamic condition
The system may have a learning capability; that is, data are stored as the engine
is operated. This is not an essential feature. Nominal engine operational data could be
stored in the computer before startup. Another possibility would be to store the nominal
data before startup and to modify these data either by replacing the nominal data with the
current data or by averaging the current data with previous data.
A sensor failure is defined as a failure in the transducer itself, in the device which
converts the measurement to digital form (which can be part of the transducer), or in
the link between the transducer and the computer. Detection of a sensor failure can be
a difficult task. Some types, such as a catastrophic failure (hard failure), which is
characterized by a sudden change to some unrealistic value, are easy to detect. Others,
such as a slow change (soft failure) to some value still within the allowable operating
range, are difficult to detect.
In estimating the value of a particular failed measured variable, some of the valid
measurements are better to use than others because some variables are more closely
coupled together. When possible, it is better to use a closely coupled variable to esti-
mate a value for an invalid measurement.
IMPLEMENTATION ON THE TF30-P-3 ENGINE
A sensor fail-operational digital computer program was written for the TF30-P-3
engine. Features of this program are described in this section.
Learning Procedure
Engine operational data were stored (or learned) as the simulated engine was oper-
ated over its complete range. The procedure consisted of varying power lever angle
from idle to full afterburning for all three possible bleed settings. Bleeds were oper-
ated manually for this initial learning. The variations were at two rates: slow, to ap-
proximate a series of steady-state operating points; and rapid (throttle slam), to obtain
acceleration data.
Data were not stored during deceleration. It was found that separate data for en-
gine deceleration were not needed; the steady-state data were adequate for estimating
values during deceleration.
This procedure may not be practical for the actual engine. As was pointed out pre-
viously, it might be better to store nominal engine operational data in the computer be-
fore engine startup. This would eliminate the necessity of extensive operation of the\
engine before flight. The matter of initially getting the data in the computer is an op-
erational problem and is considered to be beyond the scope of this report.
The tables of stored measured engine variables are listed in table ffl. The relations
between each pair of the six possible pairs formed from four corrected measured engine
variables are stored. Each table is divided into three parts, the data occupying each
part corresponding to one of the three possible bleed setting combinations. Each sep-
arate part was allocated 64 words of core storage.
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The data are stored as follows: The range of each independent variable in each table
was first subdivided into equal increments. The increment end values are called sub-
division points. The computer cycles and samples values of the variables to be stored.
When a measured value of an independent variable is within 20 percent of one of the
subdivision points, the associated value of the dependent variable is taken as the value
corresponding to that subdivision point. For each subdivision point, values are simply
averaged until 32 samples have been taken; thereafter, a weighted average is taken.
The current stored value is weighted by a factor of 31/32, and the present sampled val-
ue by a factor of 1/32. This feature of updating the stored data allows for the slow deg-
radation of engine performance but unfortunately also includes the effect of slow degra-
dation of the sensors, an effect it would be desirable to eliminate.
In order to fill any locations (subdivision points) for which no measurements have
been made, a linear interpolation scheme is used. In addition, the data are extrapolated
beyond the upper and lower values corresponding to the upper and lower values of power
lever angle. This is done by extending straight-line segments beyond the learned data.
The slopes of the line segments are determined from the maximum and minimum points.
Failure Tests
During the learning phase of operation, failure tests of only the command input and
the compressor face variables are made. No failure tests of engine measurements are
made until operational data for all bleed settings and both dynamic conditions have been
learned over the complete range of power settings. (This is important only if the data
are learned during operation and not if nominal engine data are initially stored in the
computer.) The variables tested are the command input variable (power lever angle),
the measured compressor face variables (total temperature and total pressure), and the
measured engine variables (corrected high-pressure-rotor speed, corrected high-
pressure-compressor discharge static pressure, corrected low-pressure-compressor
discharge static pressure, corrected nozzle total pressure, and nozzle area). The
flight condition variables (Mach number and ambient pressure) come from the inlet con-
trol and are assumed to be always correct; they are therefore not tested.
The commanded value of power lever angle is directed to the sensor fail-operational
computer program because under some conditions the program substitutes a different
value than commanded. Although steps will be taken to assure the reliability of this in-
put variable, a test is made to further assure its accuracy. The test consists of simply
determining whether the variable is within its permissible range of values.
The measured compressor face variables (total temperature and total pressure) are
monitored for any changes which would be physically impossible under normal operation.
The changes associated with changing flight conditions occur rather slowly and are not
interpreted as a failure. There are fluctuations in these variables when the afterburner
is lit. Any flight system must allow these changes to pass through the failure detection
logic.
The measured engine variables, with the exception of nozzle area, are tested to de-
termine whether they are within their range of permissible values, that is, the maximum
and minimum values the corrected variables can assume. This particular test detects
only catastrophic failures (hard failures). The nozzle area is tested to ensure that it is
properly following the nozzle area command. This test can be made because the digital
control calculates a nozzle area from the command and a dynamic model of the nozzle
(ref. 5). If the difference between the actual area and the calculated area exceeds a
specified value, the nozzle area sensor is assumed to have failed.
Action under Failure
When a sensor failure has been detected, the action taken depends, of course, on the
type of failure. One common action under any type of failure is that further learning
ceases.
If the command input (power lever angle) is in error, the computer program gen-
erates a command which shuts down the engine. Nothing else can be done.
Since the compressor face variables are used to correct the engine measurements,
an accurate test of and estimate for engine measurements cannot be made if a compres-
sor face sensor has failed. Therefore, for this type of failure, the engine is shut down
by a command from the computer program. Because/of the importance of having valid
compressor face measurements, these sensors should probably be redundant.
In the case of a nozzle area sensor failure, the invalid measurement is replaced by
the calculated value used in the detection of the failure.
For the case of a single failure of one of the four remaining engine sensors, an es-
timate is made from the three valid measurements and the tables of stored data. For
each valid measurement, an estimate is obtained from the appropriate table (for the
particular bleed condition and engine dynamic state) relating the two variables by linear
interpolation between the stored values. An average of the three estimates is taken,
and the resultant value is used by the engine control. In this case and in those for which
more than one estimate is available, the estimates are weighted equally. No work was
done on examining the effect of unequal weighting. In the case of two failures, the ac-
tion is similar except this time only two values are averaged to obtain an estimate for
each of the two invalid measurements. Tn the o.asp nf thrpp failures, an estimate for
each of the three invalid measurements is made from the single remaining valid meas-
urement. In the highly unlikely case of four failures, the computer program commands
the engine to shut down.
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Bleed Control under Failure
Because the bleeds are controlled by measured variables and the estimates for in-
valid measurements are a function of the bleed position, it is important to assure that
the bleeds operate properly under failure.
The seventh-stage bleed is controlled by the Mach number signal only, which is as-
sumed to be always correct. Therefore, the seventh-stage-bleed condition will always
be correct under all allowable failures.
The twelfth-stage bleed is controlled by the low-pressure-compressor discharge
static pressure and the compressor face total pressure. If the low-pressure-
compressor-discharge-static-pressure sensor should fail, a value is estimated for it
by the procedure described previously. If the estimated value is close enough to the
actual value, the bleed should operate normally. If the compressor-face-total-pressure
sensor should fail, the engine is shut down as previously stated.
Computer Program Outline
A flow chart of the sensor fail-operational digital computer program is presented
in figure 7. The numbers on the following outline correspond to the numbers on the
flow chart:
(1) The engine measurements are corrected. The three pressures are divided by
6, the ratio of compressor face total pressure to standard sea-level pressure; the high-
pressure-rotor speed is divided by t^T, 9 being the ratio of the compressor face total
temperature to standard sea-level temperature.
(2) The power lever angle is tested. If it is invalid, the engine is shut down.
(3) The compressor face total pressure and total temperature sensors are tested.
If either has failed, the engine is shut down.
(4) A test is performed to determine whether sufficient data have been learned. If
not, data for the current operating point are learned and the program is exited.
(5) If sufficient data have been learned, the engine measurements are tested.
(6) If there are no sensor failures, data for the current operating point are learned
and the program is exited.
(7) If all the engine sensors (not including nozzle area) have failed, the engine is
shut down.
(8) Values for the invalid engine measurements are estimated from the valid meas-
urements and the tables of stored data.
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Comparison of Measured Engine Variable Relations
The method of estimating values for invalid engine measurements is based upon the
assumption that the relations between the corrected measured engine variables remain
nearly the same at all flight conditions. In order to determine if this is indeed so, data
were collected at the five flight conditions indicated by the circular symbols in figure 2.
It would have been preferable to examine the points of extreme compressor face total
pressure and temperature indicated in the figure; however, these points were beyond
the range of the engine simulation. The selected points are sea-level static; a typical
cruise condition, Mach 0. 8 at 9. 2-kilometer (30 000-ft) altitude; a flight condition at
which the compressor face total pressure is high, Mach 1. 2 at 3.0-kilometer (10 000-
ft) altitude; a flight condition at which the compressor face total temperature is high,
Mach 2. 2 at 15. 2-kilometer (50 000-ft) altitude; and a supersonic flight condition at
which the compressor face pressure and temperature are nearly equal to the values for
the subsonic cruise condition, Mach 1.2 at 12. 2-kilometer (40 000-ft) altitude. The
values for the compressora.,face variables and the correction factors for each flight con-
dition are listed in the following table:
Flight condition
Mach
number,
M
(a)
.8
1.2
1.2
2.2
Altitude,
km
.(a)
9.2
3.0
12.2
15.2
n
ft
(a)
SOxlO3
10
40
50
Compressor
face total
temperature,
TT2
K
288
258
346
279
426
°R
519
465
622
511
767
Compressor
face total
pressure,
PT2
N/cm2
10.1
4.6
16.9
4.5
11.2
psi
14.7
6.7
24.5
6.6
16.3
Temperature
correction
factor,
• frT- fTT2
w H -«/T
 YTSTD
i
.95
1.10
.99
1.22
Pressure
correction
factor,
d- PT2
PSTD
1
.45
1.67
.45
1.11
aSea-level static.
The relations between the measured engine variables were obtained by first clearing
the tables of any stored data and then using the self-learning feature of the sensor fail-
operational digital computer program at each flight condition. The procedure involved
running the simulated engine over the complete range of power lever angle for all pos-
sible bleed settings and for both steady-state operation and engine acceleration.
The data obtained in this manner were then compared. Examples of the relations
between the measured engine variables are presented in figure 8. The examples show
all six possible relations involving the four variables for steady-state operation and for
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both bleeds being closed, except the Mach 2. 2, 15. 2-kilometer (50 000-ft) night condi-
tion, for which the seventh-stage bleed is open. It can be seen from this figure that
there is little difference among the data for all the flight conditions, with the exception
of sea-level static. The difference between the data at sea-level static and those at the
other conditions is explained by the fact that the nozzle is unchoked at the sea-level
static condition over most of its range. At the other flight conditions the nozzle is
choked over most or all of its range of power lever angle.
The difference in the data for these cases appeared to be significant enough to re-
quire the storing of two sets of data: one for the choked nozzle, the other for the un-
choked nozzle. The following test was included to determine the nozzle condition: If the
ratio of ambient pressure to nozzle total pressure is greater than the critical value (PO/
PT7 > 0. 542), the nozzle is unchoked. Unchoked nozzle data were collected at sea-level
static operation, and choked nozzle data were collected at the Mach 0. 8, 9.2-kilometer
(30 000-ft) flight condition. The test for the nozzle condition also determines what set
of data is to be used in estimating a value for any invalid measurement; but the test of
the nozzle condition requires one of the measured engine variables, the nozzle total
pressure. If this particular sensor should fail, there would be no way of determining
which set of data should be used. An arbitrary decision was made to use the choked noz-
zle data when the nozzle total pressure sensor was found to have failed.
Figure 9 illustrates the effect twelfth-stage bleed has on the measured engine vari-
able data. This particular example shows the steady-state relation between the corrected
high-pressure-rotor speed and the corrected high-pressure-compressor discharge stat-
ic pressure for the twelfth-stage bleed open and closed. Data are shown for two flight
conditions: sea-level static; and Mach 0. 8, 9.2-kilometer (30 000-ft) altitude. It can
be seen that opening the twelfth-stage bleed has the effect of shifting both curves to the
right; that is, the pressure associated with a particular rotor speed is higher with the
bleed open. The difference between the two cases appears to be great enough to require
storing both sets of data.
Only one flight condition was examined for which the seventh-stage bleed was open:
Mach 2. 2, 15. 2 kilometers (50 000 ft). At this flight condition, a lower limit on engine
speed imposed by the control does not allow much variation in the measured engine var-
iables. Over this small range, there appears to be no difference between the data col-
lected with the seventh-stage bleed open and with it closed. This is illustrated in figure
10 in which the steady-state relation between the corrected high-pressure-rotor speed
and the corrected high-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure is presented.
It seems that separate data for the two cases need not be collected.
Separate data were also collected for steady-state operation and for operation when
the fuel flow was limited by the acceleration schedule in the control. An example of
the data for these two cases is shown in figure 11. It shows the relation between high-
pressure-rotor speed and high-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure for both
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steady-state operation and acceleration at two flight conditions: sea-level static; and
Mach 0. 8, 9. 2-kilometer (30 000-ft) altitude. The difference between the data sets is
small at the altitude condition. At sea-level static operation, the difference between
the two sets of data is somewhat greater.
The approach taken in this study was to collect data for all possible engine geom-
etries and dynamic conditions, as well as for both nozzle conditions, to obtain the best
possible fail-operational control system. After this, the control system was tested
using less complete data to determine just how much information is necessary to obtain
acceptable results.
Limits on Estimated Variables
When a measured engine variable sensor has failed and the measured value is re-
placed with an estimate obtained from the other measurements, there is a possibility
that the estimated value may change the operation of the engine and hence the measure-
ments that are used to estimate a value for the invalid measurement. This could re-
sult in an unstable situation in some cases. Limits had to be put on the estimated values
of two measured engine variables at the extreme values of power lever angle. A lower
limit had to be placed on the estimated value of high-pressure-compressor discharge
static pressure. When this variable is estimated low at a low value of power lever angle,
the fuel flow, which is controlled by this pressure and the high-pressure-rotor speed,
decreases. This causes a reduction in the measured variables used to estimate com-
pressor pressure and hence a reduction in the estimated value of this variable. The
process continues until the fuel flow stops altogether. This problem was encountered
only at near-idle values of power lever angle and was solved by placing a lower limit on
the estimated value of high-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure equal to the
value that it normally would have at idle for the particular nozzle condition.
It was also necessary to impose this lower limit on high-pressure-compressor dis-
charge static pressure when the high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failed at low values
of power lever angle. If the speed is estimated high, the fuel flow decreases. This re-
duces the actual speed and also the high-pressure-compressor discharge static pres-
sure, which in turn tends to reduce fuel flow. The difference between the requested
speed and the estimate of the actual speed tends to increase the fuel flow. But its effect
is not sufficient to offset the reduction caused by the decreased value of high-pressure-
compressor discharge static pressure. Consequently, the fuel flow continues to de-
crease until the engine stops running.
An upper limit on the estimated value of nozzle total pressure was necessary during
afterburning operation, that is, when the power lever angle was above 69 . As men-
tioned previously, this pressure determines the nozzle area and the afterburner-zone
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fuel flows. If it is estimated high, the nozzle opens more than it should, decreasing
the actual value of the nozzle total pressure. This tends to increase the low-pressure-
rotor speed and the low-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure, which tends
to further increase estimated nozzle total pressure. This process continues, causing
abnormal nozzle and zone fuel-flow operation. The difficulty was corrected by limiting
nozzle total pressure to the value that it has just before afterburning begins. This es-
sentially eliminated nozzle total pressure as a control variable for the nozzle and zone
fuel flows. The control function was fulfilled by the other variables: high-pressure-
compressor discharge pressure and high-pressure-rotor speed.
There might be a problem with this latter limit as the flight condition is changed
while the engine remains in afterburning operation. This could be solved by changing
the limit on nozzle pressure when the values of compressor face total temperature and
pressure change by some specified amount, indicating a large change in flight condition.
The nozzle pressure measurement is also used to detect afterburner light-off and
blowout. If this particular measurement is being estimated from other engine measure-
ments, errors in the estimate cause no serious operational limit violations during light-
off. However, in the case of a blowout, the error in the estimated nozzle total pressure
causes serious operational limit violations. Therefore, provision would have to be made
to detect blowouts in some other manner.
Engine Performance
The unchoked nozzle data obtained at sea-level static condition and the choked noz-
zle data obtained at the Mach 0. 8, 9. 2-kilometer (30 000-ft) flight condition were stored
in the computer. Learning was then halted so that no additional data would be averaged
with the original data. The sensor fail-operational control system was then tested at
each of the five selected flight conditions. At each condition, all combinations of the
four engine sensors (not including nozzle area) were failed, and the simulated engine was
subjected to throttle variations from idle to military power (power lever angle from 15°
to 69°) and from idle to full afterburning (power lever angle from 15° to 120°). Throttle
variations were made both slowly, to simulate a series of steady-state operating points,
and rapidly, to determine performance for throttle slams and chops.
The effectiveness of the sensor fail-operational control system was judged by the
following two criteria: First, it was necessary that none of the engine operating limits
be exceeded: the surge margin of either of the two compressors or the fan may not be
reduced; the turbine-inlet-temperature limit may not be exceeded; and the high-
pressure-rotor-speed limit may not be exceeded. Second, it was desirable that the
performance of the engine not be degraded; that is, that nearly the same thrust be ob-
tained at a particular power lever angle and nearly the same thrust response result
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from a change in power lever angle.
The significant results were these: For nonafterburning operation (power lever ang-
le less than 69 ), the simulated engine could be acceptably controlled with as many as
three of the four engine sensors failed. One of the four variables, nozzle total pressure,
does not affect operation when there is no afterburning; so its failure 'had no effect.
Another variable, the low-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure, affects the
twelfth-stage-bleed operation only. Results indicate that an acceptable value could be
estimated for this variable from only one valid measurement. Acceptable values for the
other two variables could also be obtained from only one valid measurement. For op-
eration in the afterburning range (power lever angle from 69 to 120 ), the engine could
be acceptably controlled with no more than a single sensor failure, and then only if a
modest, power-lever-angle rate limit is imposed (approx. 3 deg/sec). The low-
pressure-compressor-discharge-static-pressure sensor could not be failed along with
any of the other sensors even though it does not affect afterburning operation. Appar-
ently, estimates based on this variable are needed to construct values for any invalid
measurement.
It is suspected that the limitation on failures in the afterburning range and the need
for a power-lever-angle rate limit arise primarily from the use of an integrator loop
(which eliminates steady-state error) in the afterburner control. This type of control is
more sensitive to any difference between an estimated value for a variable and the true
value it replaces.
Even with only a single failure of one of the variables affecting afterburning opera-
tion, the fifth-zone afterburner fuel flow in some cases was somewhat different from
normal. The differences were not considered to be great enough to cause any difficulty.
Acceptable control was defined earlier as not violating any of the engine operating
limits and providing nearly the same thrust response. In order to illustrate a typical
comparison between engine performance under sensor fail-operational control and nor-
mal performance, a series of figures is presented for one particular single failure, that
of a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor. The assumed flight condition is Mach 1. 2 and
3.0-kilometer (10 000-ft) altitude. This flight condition was selected because the dif-
ference between the pressure correction factor at this condition and that at which the
data were learned is greater than that for any other flight conditions examined. Figure
12 compares the loci of operating points for failed and normal performance on both the
low-pressure- and high-pressure-compressor maps for steady-state operation and for
a throttle slam from idle to full afterburning. Figure 13 compares high-pressure-rotor
speed for failed and normal performance. For the failed case, both the actual speed
and the estimated speed used by the control are presented. Figure 14 compares turbine
inlet temperature for the two cases. The thrust obtained with a high-pressure-rotor-
speed sensor failure is compared with normal thrust in figure 15. These figures indi-
cate that the simulated engine performs fairly normally under sensor fail-ope rational
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control with the high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure.
A similar set of comparisons for a double failure is presented in figures 16 to 19.
In this case, the two sensor failures are high-pressure-rotor speed and high-pressure-
compressor discharge static pressure. The flight condition is again Mach 1. 2 and 3. 0-
kilometer (10 000-ft) altitude. However, power lever angle is varied only from idle to
military power. Failure of these two sensors means that main fuel flow must be con-
trolled with only estimated values for the necessary variables. Again, these figures in-
dicate that the simulated engine under sensor fail-operational control performs very
nearly as it does normally.
Operation with Reduced Data Storage
Previous comparisons of the stored data for any particular flight condition reveal
small differences between some of the curves. For example, the data for seventh-
stage bleed open do not differ much from that for it closed (fig, 10). The sensor fail-
operational program was again tested at the flight condition for which the seventh-stage
bleed is open; Mach 2. 2 and 15. 2-kilometer (50 000-ft) altitude. This time, however,
the data obtained when the seventh-stage bleed was closed were used. There appeared
to be no difference in performance., It is believed that data need not be collected for
seventh-stage bleed open. This reduces the data storage requirement and simplifies the
collecting of data.
Operation of the sensor fail-operational control system with only one set of twelfth-
stage-bleed data, either for the bleed open or closed, did not produce satisfactory per-
formance. Apparently, the differences between the relations in the two cases are suf-
ficiently great to require both sets of data to be stored.
The data curves obtained during acceleration compare closely with the curves ob-
tained for steady-state operation (fig. 11). Based on this observation the sensor fail-
operational control system was tested by using the steady-state data to estimate values
during acceleration. The performance of the simulated engine for this test was essen-
tially the same as that obtained when the acceleration data were used. An example of
this result is presented in figures 20 to 23. The case shown is for a throttle slam from
idle to full afterburning with a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure. The flight
condition is again Mach 1. 2 and 3. 0-kilometer (10 000-ft) altitude. These figures com-
pare the performance obtained with steady-state data and that obtained with acceleration
data. Figure 20 compares the loci of operating points on both the low-pressure- and
high-pressure-compressor maps; figure 21 compares the high-pressure-rotor speeds;
figure 22, the turbine inlet temperatures; and figure 23, the thrust responses. Based
on results of this type, it appears that separate acceleration data need not be collected.
Even though there is a large difference between the data collected when the nozzle
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is choked and when it is unchoked, the sensor fail-operational control system was tested
using the unchoked data only (data collected at sea-level static operation). Surprisingly,
for the most part the results were the same as those obtained with the two separate sets
of data. In some cases, however, there was a slight reduction in high-pressure-
compressor surge margin. It appears that it might be possible to collect data at sea-
level static operation only. This would greatly simplify the collection of data if it is to
be learned. The lower limit on high-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure
had to be modified for this test. At any of the flight conditions other than sea-level
static (i. e., when the nozzle is choked), the lower limit on this pressure was set equal
to the value it normally would have at idle at the respective flight conditions. This val-
ue would either have to be learned or predetermined.
Computer Requirements
The sensor fail-operational digital computer program (exclusive of the stored data)
requires about 2000 words of core storage. The complete set of stored engine data re-
quires 4600 words of core storage. This latter requirement can be cut in half if accel-
eration data are not stored and further reduced by 1/3 if data for open seventh-stage
bleed are not stored. Also, the number could be reduced by using less than the 64 words
for each data curve. Even with the 4600 words of data, the total storage requirement of
the sensor fail-operational program is only 6600 words. This requirement, added to the
5000-word requirement for the BOM control, comes to 11 600. With a 16 000-word-
storage computer, over 4000 words would be available for other tasks.
The computation time required by the sensor fail-operational digital computer pro-
gram depends upon a number of factors. During learning (when no variable estimation
is being done), the computation time depends upon the number of data points that are be-
ing learned during that particular cycle. The maximum computation time observed dur-
ing learning was about 13 milliseconds. During engine variable estimation (when no ad-
ditional learning takes place), the computation time depends upon the number of meas-
urements that must be estimated. The time is not directly proportional to the number
of failures, however, because the number of table lookups (which require the most time)
is not proportional to the number of failures. Estimation of a single variable requires
about 3 milliseconds; both a double and a triple failure require about 4 milliseconds. As
stated previously, a sampling interval of 25 milliseconds was selected for this study.
The maximum time required by the sensor fail-operational digital computer program
added to the 3 milliseconds required by the digital BOM control comes to 16 milliseconds.
About 9 milliseconds of computation time would be available for other tasks. It is felt
that with more efficient programming, computation time could be reduced considerably.
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CONCLUSIONS
The study indicates that a sensor fail-operational control system can be used to pro-
vide acceptable control of a two-spool turbofan engine over a wide range of flight con-
ditions with as many as three of the four engine sensors failed for nonafterburning en-
gine operation. For afterburning operation, the sensor fail-operational system pro-
vides acceptable control for only a single engine sensor failure. In this case, it is nec-
essary that a slight limit be imposed upon engine acceleration. Because such an ex-
treme range of compressor face conditions was investigated, the results obtained are
applicable over a wide range of flight conditions. Further testing is required to ensure
that results are applicable over the entire engine operating envelope.
The sensor fail-operational control system was evaluated on a real-time, nonlinear,
hybrid-computer simulation of a turbofan engine. The results of this study should be
verified by using the system to control an actual engine.
The engine variables were tested for catastrophic sensor failure only. The failure-
detection part of the system could be expanded so that other types of failures can be
handled. This is an area in which further work could be done.
The Mach number measurement, which is received from the inlet control, was as-
sumed to be always correct. In an integrated inlet and engine control system, it might
be possible to handle a failure of this variable.
Finally, it should be noted that this particular sensor fail-operational control sys-
tem was designed to be "added on" to a digital representation of the basic bill-of -
materials hydromechanical control system. Fail-operational requirements could have
an effect upon the design of a completely new control system. Such a system may not
have some of the limitations reported herein.
Lewis Research Center,
National Aeronautics and Space Administration,
Cleveland, Ohio, July 30, 1975,
505-05.
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APPENDIX - SYMBOLS
2 2AJ nozzle area, m (ft )
2 2AJC commanded nozzle area, m (ft )
BL7 seventh-stage bleed
BL12 twelfth-stage bleed
F net thrust, N (Ibf)
h altitude, km (ft)
M Mach number
N2 high-pressure-rotor speed, rpm
corrected high-pressure-rotor speed, rpm
PLA power lever angle, deg
2
PSTD standard-day, sea-level pressure, 10.1 N/cm (14.7 psi)
2
PS3 low-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure, N/cm (psi)
o
PS3/6 corrected low-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure, N/cm (psi)
n
PS4 high-pressure-compressor discharge (combustor) static pressure, N/cm (psi)
PS4/6 corrected high-pressure-compressor discharge (combustor) static pressure,
o
N/cm (psi)
2
PT2 compressor face total pressure, N/cm (psi)
2PT7 nozzle total pressure, N/cm (psi)
o
PT7/6 corrected nozzle total pressure, N/cm (psi)
2
PO ambient pressure, N/cm (psi)
TSTD standard-day, sea-level temperature, 288 K (519° R)
TT2 compressor face total temperature, K (°R)
T5 turbine inlet temperature, K (°R)
t time, sec '
WF main fuel flow, kg/sec (Ibm/sec)
WFZn zone n afterburner fuel flow (n = 1, . . . , 5), kg/sec (Ibm/sec)
6 ratio of compressor face total pressure to standard-day sea-level pressure,
PT2/PSTD
20
0 ratio of compressor face total temperature to standard-day sea-level tem-
perature, TT2/TSTD
Engine station numbers (fig. 1):
2 compressor face
3 ' low-pressure-compressor discharge
4 high-pressure-compressor discharge
5 turbine inlet
7 nozzle
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TABLE I. - VARIABLES USED FOR CONTROL OF TF30-P-3 ENGINE
Variable Symbol
Command input: power lever angle
Flight condition:
Mach number
Ambient pressure
Measured compressor face;
Total temperature
Total pressure
Measured engine:
High-pressure-rotor speed
High-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure
Low-pressure-compressor discharge static pressure
Nozzle total pressure
Nozzle area
Manipulated:
Main fuel flow
Seventh-stage bleed
Twelfth-stage bleed
Nozzle area
Afterburner fuel flow:
Zone 1
Zone 2
Zone 3
Zone 4
Zone 5
Controlled: net thrust
PLA
M
PO
TT2
PT2
N2
PS4
PS3
PT7
AJ
WF
BL7
BL12
AJC
WFZ1
WFZ2
WFZ3
WFZ4
WFZ5
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TABLE n. - DIGITAL SYSTEM CAPABILITIES
Digital computer
Magnetic core memory size, words
Word length, bits plus parity
Memory cycle time, nsec
Add time, Msec
Subtract time, /usec
Multiply time, Msec
Divide time, Msec
Load time, Msec
Store time, jusec
Indirect addressing
Indexing
Priority interrupts
Index registers:
Independent
In conjunction with lower accumulator
Physical size, in.:
Width
Height
Depth
16 384
16
750
1.5
1.5
4.5
8.25
1.5
1.5
Infinite
Total memory
28 Separate levels
1
1
24
62
30
Interval timers
Complement
Accuracy, clock pulses
Clock rates, kHz
Counter
Output
2
±1
572, 286, 160, 143, 80, 71.5.
40, 35, 75, 20, 10
16-Bit binary
Priority interrupt to computer
Analog acquisition unit
Overall sample rate (maximum), kHz
Resolution of digital data, bits
Output code
Number of channels
Input range, V full scale
Input impedance, MO (shunted by 10 pF)
Maximum source resistance, fi
Conversion time, Msec •.
Input setting time, Msec
Sample-and-hold aperture time, nsec
Safe input voltages, V
Total error with calibration, percent
20
12 (plus sign)
Two's complement
64
±10
10
1000
38
9
500
±20 sustained
±100 for less than 100 Msec
0.073
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TABLE H. - Concluded.
Frequency acquisition unit
Number of channels
Nature of input
Resolution of digital data, bits
Switch selectable clock rates, kHz
Overall accuracy, bits
Update rate
Maximum input frequency, kHz
Input amplitude range
10
Continuously varying or pulsatile
12
20, 80, 100, 400, external
±1
Once per cycle of input frequency
1
100 mV to 30 V peak to peak
Analog output unit
Total number of digital-to-analog
conversion channels
Resolution (10 channels), bits
Resolution (16 channels), bits
Output voltage range, V full scale
Output current (maximum), mA
Output impedance, f2
Accuracy (12 bit), percent of full scale
Accuracy (13 bit), percent of full scale
Slew rate, V/fisec
Settling time for 10-V step to within 0. 05
percent of final value, fisec
26
12 (plus sign)
11 (plus sign)
±10
10
<1
±0,1
±0.05
1
20
Logical output unit
Number of electronic switch outputs
Number of contact closure outputs
Maximum voltage, V
Maximum current, mA
32
32
30
100
Priority interrupt processor
Number of channels
Input impedance, kO
Input voltage range, V
Comparator switching
Comparator hysteresis
Comparator output, V
Monostable multivibrator:
Pulse width, p.sec
Pulse height, V
10
47
±10
Trigger on rise or fall
Adjustable from 35 mV to 650 mV
+7
.3
•4-7
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TABLE HI. - TABLES OF STORED, MEASURED ENGINE VARIABLES
Table
1
2
3
'4
5
6
Data
N2/y0" against PT7/6
N2y0~ against PS4/6
N2V0 against PS3/6
PS4/6 against PT7/6
PS3/6 against PT7/6
PS3/6 against PS4/6
Units
ft
rpm, N/cm (psi)
rpm, N/cm (psi)
rpm, N/cm (psi)
N/cm2 (psi)
N/cm (psi)
N/cm2 (psi)
Independent variable
Range
N/cm2
10.3 - 29.0
20. 7 - 207
0 - 7 4 . 5
10. 3 - 29. 0
10.3 - 29.0
20.7 - 207
psi
15- 42
30 - 300
0 - 108
15 - 42
15 - 42
30 - 300
Increment
N/cm2
0,34
3.4
1.4
.34
.34
3.4
psi
0.50
5.0
2.0
.50
.50
5.0
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s27
7x10"
S 3
Minimum-PT2
(UN/cm2; 1.6psi)
25]— flight condition:
Mach 1.0, 20-km
(65 000-ft) altitude-,
"— 20
15
— < 10
(224 K; 404° R)
flight condition:
Mach 0.42, 11-km
(36 000-ft) altitude
rMaximum-TT2
' (488 K; 878° R)
flight condition:
Mach 2.5, 15.2-km
(50 000-ft) altitude
5- // (34N/cm
2; 49psi)
flight condition.-
Mach 1.72, 3-km
(10 000-ft) altitude
.5 1.0 1.5
Mach number, M
2.0 2.5
Figure 2. - Engine operating limits for TF30-P-3 engine.
EAI 690 hybrid
EA 1 640 digital
Function generation
for-
Fan
Low-pressure
compressor
High-pressure
compressor
Turbines
EAI 680 analog
Fan input calculations
Low-pressure-compressor
input calculations
High -press u re-compressor
input calculations
640-680 Interface
Control interface
SEL 810B digital
Control
Central
patching
EAI 231 -R analog
Duct
Duct afterburner
Duct nozzle
EAI 231-R analog
Combustor
Turbine input calculations
Core afterburner
Core nozzle
Rotor dynamics
Figure 3. - Split of TF30-P-3 simulation computational load.
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—Command input—••
Digitalization of
BOM TF30-P-3 control
(-5000 words)
Sensor fail-operational
digital program
(6600 words)
Process-control-type
digital computer
(16 000-word memory)
Manipulated
-variable
commands
Two analog computers
Simulation of fuel lines
and control actuators
-Flight condition variables
-Measured compressor face variables
Measured engine variables
ght condition »
Manipulated
variables ~*~
3 lC"
Real-time hybrid
simulation of inlet
(MIL-E-5008 B,
standard pressure
recovery) and
TF30-P-3 engine:
185 Amplifiers
85 Multipliers
10 000 Words
_Controlled_
variable
Three analog consoles1
Digital computer
(16 000-word memory)
Figure 4. - System used in evaluating sensor fail-operational system.
Surge line
Operating line
Constant corrected speed
Corrected airflow
Figure 5. - Schematic representation of a corrected compressor map.
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Flight condition
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-Command input— Normal control Manipulated
variable commands
Measured
compressor
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Flight condition
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{input
I 1
-Command input-*-
ii
Normal control
i
Measu red
compressor
1 face variables!
Fail-operational
digital computer
program
i_
la) Convent!
Man
Engine
Measured
engine
variables
onal engine control system.
— 1
ipuldled _
variable commands
• —
^-Measured
engine
i
Measured
compressor face
variables
1
1 . '
1
1
1
J
Engine
Measured
engine
variables
-Controlled variable-
-Controlled variable—
(b) Sensor fail-operational control system.
Figure 6. - Comparison of a conventional engine control system with a sensor fail-operational control system.
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No / Has power lever \ Yes
\ angle failed? /
No / Has either compressor \ Yes
No
Yes / A r e there any \__No_
sensor failures?
Are there less than X No
four sensor failures? /
^Return
Figure 7. - Flow chart of TF30-P-3 sensor fail-operational digital computer program.
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15x10*
1
13
12
11
10
Flight condition
Sea-level static
Mach 0.8, 9. 2-km
(30 000-ft) altitude
Twelfth-stage
bleed closedn
Twelfth-stage
bleed closed7
Twelfth-stage
bleed open
-Twelfth-stage
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Figure 9. - Effect of twelfth-stage-bleed condition on measured
engine variable data for two flight conditions. Steady-state
operation; seventh-stage bleed closed. (Data from table 2.)
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Figure 10. - Effect of seventh-stage-bleed condition
on measured engine variable data at Mach 2.2,
15.2-km (50 000-ft) flight condition. Steady-
state operation; twelfth-stage bleed closed. (Data
from table 2).
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Figure 11. - Comparison of steady-state data with data obtained
during engine acceleration for two flight conditions. Both
twelfth-stage and seventh-stage bleeds closed. (Data from
table 2.)
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Figure 12. - Compressor operating lines for normal operation and for a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure.
Flight condition, Mach L2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude,- data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km {30 000-ft)
altitude.
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(a) Acceleration and deceleration.
(bl Steady state.
Figure 13. - High-pressure-rotor speed for normal operation and for a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor
failure. Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and
9.2-km (30 000-tt) altitude.
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Figure 14. - Turbine inlet temperature for normal operation and for a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure.
Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft)
altitude.
37
aoxio3
E,
(a) Acceleration and deceleration
(b) Steady state.
Figure 15. - Net thrust for normal operation and for a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure. Flight condition,
Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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Figure 16. - Compressor operating lines for normal operation and for failure of the high-pressure-rotor-speed and
high-pressure-compressor-discharge-static-pressure sensors. Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft)
altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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(a) Acceleration and deceleration
(b) Steady state.
Figure 17. - High-pressure-rotor speed for normal operation and for failure of the high-pressure-rotor-speed and
high-pressure-compressor-discharge-static-pressure sensors. Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft)
altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9. 2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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(a) Acceleration and deceleration.
(b) Steady state.
Figure 18. -Turbine inlet temperature for normal operation and for failure of the high-pressure-rotor-speed and high-pressure-
compressor-discharge-static-pressure sensors. Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at
Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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Figure 19. - Net thrust for normal operation and for failure of the high-pressure-rotor-speed and high-pressure-compressor-
discharge-static-pressure sensors. Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8
and 9.2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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Figure 20. - Compressor operating lines for a throttle slam with a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure for the case
in which acceleration data are used and for the case in which steady-state data are used. Flight condition, Mach L 2
and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-tt) altitude.
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Figure 21. - High-pressure-rotor speed for a throttle slam with a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure
for the case in which acceleration data are used and for the case in which steady-state data are used.
Flight condition, Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km 110 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft)
altitude.
44
1
OJ
15
,j>*
co
5
fO
§
c
o
(1)
0)
8
<c
o:
o
-
t—
£
1
OS
C
.E
3
t^
.
4000
2000
0
4000
2000
0
—
>£
_
"~ 1 —
oS
^
"~ 0>
- O3
_"c
o>
- c
1^—
-
2000
1000
C
2000
1000
0
S"
60
Figure 22. -Turbine inlet temperature for a throttle slam with a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure for the
case in which acceleration data are used and for the case in which steady-state data are used. Flight condition,
Mach 1.2 and 3.0-km (10 000-ft) altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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Figure 23. - Net thrust for a throttle slam with a high-pressure-rotor-speed sensor failure for the case in which
acceleration data are used and for the case in which steady-state data are used. Flight condition, Mach 1.2
and 3.0-km (10 000-ttl altitude; data obtained at Mach 0.8 and 9.2-km (30 000-ft) altitude.
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